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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SECURITIES 
REGULATION: THE SPECIAL STUDY 
OF SECURITIES MARKETS 
INTRODUCTION 
No. 4 
THE SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF 
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
William L. Gary* 
MOVED perhaps by a certain institutional egoism, the Secu-rities and Exchange Commission welcomes this thorough 
symposium upon the Report of Special Study of Securities 
Markets.1 Although the product of a separate study group, this 
report has nevertheless been the focal point of debate throughout 
the Commission during the past eighteen months. Representing 
both an intensive and extensive inquiry into the securities markets, 
it is unquestionably the most ambitious and comprehensive study 
since the passage of the securities acts thirty years ago. It is not 
a sensational document-quite consciously. In our opinion, rais-
ing standards in the securities industry could best be achieved by 
thorough documentation, responsible analysis, and constructive 
criticism. Upon this premise it warrants thoughtful but critical 
review. 
I. ORIGIN OF THE SPECIAL STUDY 
The Study is the result of a resolution introduced in the House 
of Representatives by Congressman Mack,2 strongly supported by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission, and enacted by the Con-
gress as section 19(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.8 
To appreciate the motivation for the congressional resolution 
• Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission.-Ed. The author wishes to ac-
knowledge the assistance of Arthur Fleischer, Jr., Executive Assistant to the Chairman. 
1 Report of Spedal Study of Securities Markets of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) [hereinafter cited as Special 
Study]. 
2 H.R.J. Res. 438, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). 
s Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(d), 48 Stat. 881, as amended, 75 Stat. 465 
(1961), 15 U.S.C. § 78(s)(d) (Supp. IV, 1963). 
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and the Commission's support, the condition of the securities mar-
kets up to June of 1962 must be reviewed. Any analogy to 1929-
the prelude to the "great crash"-would be inapt; it can hardly 
be said that brokers' offices were so crowded that "no one could get 
a chance to inspect the tape,"4 nor had ocean liners installed sea-
going boardrooms.5 Yet this was a turbulent market in which a 
record number of companies, many highly speculative, were going 
to the public for financing. The "hot issue" was prevalent; initial 
trading markets for many new issues reflected an extravagant pre-
mium over the offering price. Price-earnings ratios were at extra-
ordinary levels. Indeed, there was a story current that earnings 
were being capitalized not only upon the future but on the here-
after. Trading volume was soaring, accompanied by noticeably 
high "fails" to receive or deliver stock certificates. The Commis-
sion's enforcement machinery was overloaded. Criminal references 
to the Department of Justice and administrative proceedings 
against brokers were at all-time highs. The most dramatic illustra-
tion of breakdown in controls was the SEC investigation of the 
American Stock Exchange,6 prompted by the Commission's expul-
sion of the leading specialist firm of Re and Re.7 
The Commission, the self-regulatory agencies, and the industry 
were overwhelmed with daily administrative problems and forced 
to meet issues on an ad hoc basis. Thus, it seemed a highly pro-
pitious time for a thorough re-examination of the state of the 
securities markets and the adequacy of investor protection. 
Even with such a brief background, it is readily understandable 
why Congress regarded an investigation as timely. The decision 
to assign responsibility to the SEC rather than leave it in the 
hands of a congressional committee was not a departure from 
precedent in the securities field. On several previous occasions, 
Congress has directed the Commission to examine particular 
subjects.8 This policy undoubtedly reflects a congressional recog-
nition of the extraordinarily complex nature of the markets, which 
are perhaps better suited for study by an agency with some ex-
pertise, rather than a congressional probe which might well cause 
unanticipated tremors in a sensitive market. 
4 NOYES, THE MARKET PLACE 328 (1938). 
5 GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH 86 (1955). 
6 SEC, STAFF REPORT ON ORGANIZATION, MANAGEMENT AND REGULATION OF CoNDUcr OF 
MEMBERS OF THE AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE (1962). 
7 Re, Re 8e Sagarese, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6551, May 4, 1961, SEC 
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6900, Sept. 21, 1962. 
8 Hearings on H.R.J. Res. 438 Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on 
Internal and Foreign Commerce, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., vol. 3, at 8-9 (1961). 
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Naturally the Commission seized upon and endorsed this 
resolution as a vehicle for re-examination. We said before the 
House Subcommittee: 
"Our present budget ... and our manpower, will not support 
a thorough study of the exchanges and over-the-counter mar-
kets at this time .... [T]he constant danger in our Commis-
sion is that with market activities and flotations at an all time 
high, we become so overwhelmed with immediate problems 
... that we are virtually forced to concentrate all our funds 
and manpower upon them and cannot do any long-range 
planning. " 9 
As already noted, we, like the securities industry, had been so 
engrossed that there was neither time nor personnel nor oppor-
tunity to back away and ask where the industry was moving and 
whether present regulations meet the changes wrought over thirty 
years. Among the developments noted in the Commission's state-
ment10 were the growth in public participation and trading vol-
ume, changes in methods of distribution and marketing (particu-
larly the rise in the number of customer's men and branch offices), 
and the enormous expansion in the over-the-counter market. There, 
sales of corporate stocks ( excluding sales of mutual fund shares 
and syndicated distributions) increased almost 700 percent in 
twelve years-from an estimated $4.9 billion in 1949 to $38.9 
billion in 1961.11 
The bi1112 became law as section 19(d) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 193418 on September 5, 1961. It authorized and 
directed the Commission "to make a study and investigation of 
the adequacy for the protection of investors, of the rules of national 
securities exchanges and national securities associations, including 
rules for the expulsion, suspension, or disciplining of a member 
for conduct inconsistent with just and equitable principles of 
trade." The wording of the law and its legislative history made 
clear that it contemplated a very broad study of the rules, practices, 
and problems in the securities business and the securities markets.14 
The remaining step was to obtain the appropriation to carry 
out the authorization; $412,500 was appropriated on September 
30, 1961, and the remaining $337,500 on October 3, 1962. 
o Id. at 8. 
10 Id. at 5-6. 
11 Special Study pt. 2, at 546-47. 
12 H.R.J. Res. 4!18, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). 
18 48 Stat. 881, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1958 &: Supp. IV, 1963) [hereinafter cited 
as Securities Exchange Act of 1934]. 
u special Study pt. I, at 1. 
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II. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
The Special Study was carried out by a separate group in the 
Commission of approximately sixty-five persons. It was staffed 
by many outside the agency, including lawyers in private practice, 
economists, university professor~, and personnel from other govern-
ment agencies, and a number from the Commission's regular staff. 
The organization of the Study presented a special challenge in a 
matter of principle: how to bring together a strong independent 
group on the one hand and yet achieve some general consensus on 
the other. There was constant discussion with the Commission, 
but the Study was given freedom to express its own views and state 
its own recommendations. This decision reflected confidence in 
both the ability and responsibility of the talent assembled-which 
proved fully justified. In commenting upon the Report, The 
London Economist said: "Americans who have long admired the 
quality of investigations conducted by the British Royal Commis-
sion may take heart. It can happen here."11S 
The emphasis on independence was deemed necessary for a 
variety of reasons. First of all, it would be difficult, if not impos-
sible to secure complete agreement of all five Commissioners on 
each statement and conclusion made in the 3,000-page analysis. 
The Congress had set a time limit on our efforts which we still 
missed by almost six months. A final Commission consensus might 
have produced much longer delay. 
Second, independent views are helpful, indeed necessary after 
thirty years. Professor Galbraith has said that "regulatory bodies, 
like the people who comprise them, have a marked life cycle. In 
youth they are vigorous, aggressive, evangelistic, and even intol-
erant. Later they mellow, and in old age-after a matter of ten 
or fifteen years-they become, with some exceptions, either an 
arm of the industry they are regulating or senile."16 I do not 
accept the hyperbole, although at times there may be a need for 
revitalization. In such a case it is obvious that independent views 
can provide a new and welcome stimulus. 
Third, the Commission will be required to act in many cases 
as a rule-making body on the recommendations of the Report. 
Frequently, the rules of an exchange or the NASD (the self-regula-
tory agency for the over-the-counter market) are involved. In 
such situations the Administrative Procedure Act and the Securi-
ties Exchange Act preclude the Commission from taking a ~efini-
1is 208 LONDON EcONOMIST 587 (1963). 
16 GALBRAITH, op. dt. supra note 5, at 171. 
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tive position on the issues raised until the views of interested per-
sons are solicited or, in certain instances, a record is made.17 
Connected with this point is the fact that firm or hardened 
· positions taken by the Commission would make it difficult to deal 
generally with the industry. An interchange of ideas with the 
affected parties, even if it were not required by law, is necessary 
to an effective program. The Study itself did not have the benefit 
of industry views on its recommendations. The Commission, on 
the other hand, should not act without them. We seek industry 
reaction on the necessity and feasibility of the proposals and alter-
native recommendations-where appropriate-to the problems 
presented. We do not have the illusion that every rule can be 
arrived at with unanimity, but, at the same time, we have the con-
viction that conversations with the industry and the self-regulatory 
bodies make for fair, reasonable, and responsible solutions. 
Finally, it was anticipated that, while the Report would focus 
on the shortcomings in the industry and in the self-regulatory 
agencies, in certain respects there would be express or implied 
criticism of the Commission itself. Institutions-government, 
quasi-public, or private-all benefit from re-examination. As an 
independent group the study was free to examine the Commission's 
own practices and did so. In our transmittal letters to Congress, we 
recognized that as an institution our performance had not always 
been satisfactory. The Report's examination of the Commission is 
perhaps not as thorough as its analysis of the self-regulatory institu-
tions, but then the Commission has Congress in turn to provide a 
continuing form of oversight. 
By emphasizing the independence of the Study group, I do not 
imply that the Commission is in any way divorcing itself from 
the Report. This was not the prevalent technique of arranging for 
others to produce a report, making it public, and then disavowing 
it when criticized. Such was not our intention. To the contrary, we 
carefully reviewed the entire Report. There were certain areas 
where at the time we were not prepared to accept a recommenda-
tion as made, and we indicated the need for further examination. 
Yet we strongly endorsed its soundness and expressed our convic-
tion that it was a thoroughly responsible document.18 
Thus, in summary, independent views were respected and yet 
Commission participation was achieved. 
17 Administrative Procedure Act § 4, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1003 (1958); 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 15A(j), 15A(k)(2), 19(b). 
18 See Special Study pt. 1, at iv-v. 
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III. THE REPORT AND ITs OUTCOME-To DATE 
It is difficult, to say the least, to summarize 3,000 pages in two 
paragraphs. As already noted, the Report is comprehensive; it 
covers an extraordinary number of areas, with primary emphasis 
on the trading markets and problems under the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, rather than the distribution process, and issues 
arising under the Securities Act of 1933.19 Its breadth may perhaps 
be appreciated by a notation of the range of its subject matter: 
qualification standards for those in the securities industry;20 selling 
and investment advisory practices;21 distributions of securities, in-
cluding problems of "hot issues" ;22 intrastate and real estate offer-
ings;23 the operation of the various securities markets, such as the 
New York Stock Exchange,24 the regional exchanges,21; the "third 
market"26 (i.e., trading of listed securities off the Exchanges), and 
the over-the-counter market,27 and the interrelationship of these 
markets; the gaps and inconsistencies in securities credit regula-
- tion;28 selected aspects of mutual funds;29 and the operation of 
self-regulation.30 
The Commission's judgment on the state of securities regula-
tion was summarized in its last letter of transmittal: "[A]Ithough 
serious problems do exist and additional controls and improve-
ments are much needed, the regulatory pattern of the securities 
acts does not require dramatic reconstruction."31 This is the point 
and counterpoint-strong-market institutions subject to varying 
degrees of specific weaknesses. Such a picture is to be contrasted 
with the gross abuses disclosed in the era prior to the enactment 
of the securities acts. 
What has been achieved by the Report thus far? To this in-
quiry there are at least three different facets: (a) actions already 
taken by the industry; (b) the legislative program; (c) rule-mak-
ing proposals. These are quite apart from the long-range effects 
of the Study, as a base for understanding the problems of the 
industry. The Study does not offer a one-week or even a one-year 
program. It will serve as a catalyst for legislation and industry 
action over an extended period of time. To say that there are at 
least 175 recommendations is just to begin to appreciate the 
burden. The problems are complex and interrelated. Some, such 
19 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1958). 
20 Special Study ch. II. 26 Id. ch. VIII D. 
21 Id. ch. III. 27 Id. ch. VII. 
~u~w~ ~u~x 
~U~N~L ~u~n 
24 Id. ch. VI. 30 Id. ch. XII. 
25 Id. ch. VIII E. 31 Id. ch. XII, at v. 
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as automation, are only emerging. Others, such as those associated 
with the commission rate structure of the New York Stock Ex-
change, call for further study. Only one point is clear: both the 
recommendations and the indirect results of the Study are focused 
in a single direction-to raise the standards within the securities 
industry. 
A. Though perhaps unanticipated, one inevitable result of a 
thorough survey is to produce changes and improvements even 
before the recommendations have been formally submitted. Sub-
jected to voluminous questionnaires which developed the changes 
that have taken place, the industry had an opportunity to re-
examine itself. Even while the Report was in process, the financial 
community and the self-regulatory agencies took numerous bene-
ficial steps. The former president of the Investment Bankers 
Association, for example, acknowledged that many firms had 
tightened controls and supervision over selling practices as a 
result of the Study.82 The New York Stock Exchange strengthened 
qualification standards for principals and registered representa-
tives, commenced a program of branch office inspections, and im-
proved its surveillance techniques with regard to the "floor."88 
Finally, the NASD began a program of rewriting its Rules of 
Conduct, increased its staff, and toughened its examination for 
salesmen.84 
I do not maintain that all of these changes, and the many more 
that have taken place, are wholly attributable to the Special Study. 
Undoubtedly, this is so in many cases, while in others the Study 
may have merely accelerated consideration of a problem._ The 
important point is that the Study has presented the financial 
community, as it did the Commission, with an opportunity for 
re-examination-to make its own special study. 
B. The second outcome of the Report has been the Commis-
sion's legislative program, which has passed the Senate and is now 
(in late 1963) pending before the House.85 Immediately after 
transmittal of the first segment of the Report to Congress, the 
Commission drafted its legislative proposals. Intensive conferences 
were then had with representatives of major industry groups and 
a bill was developed which was acceptable both to industry and 
to the Commission. 
32 Address by Curtis H. Bingham, President, Investment Bankers Association of 
America, November, 1962. 
83 Special Study pt. 4, at 569-70 
84 Id. at 671-73. 
BIS S. 1642, H.R. 6789, H.R. 6793, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). 
564 MICHIGAN LAW REvmw [Vol. 62 
In its broadest terms, the bill has two major purposes. The first 
is to improve investor protection in the over-the-counter market, 
primarily by extending fundamental disclosure requirements. 
Disclosures now furnished by listed companies would be required 
also of companies whose securities are traded in the over-the-
counter market, and in which there is a substantial public interest. 
The second major purpose is to strengthen qualification standards 
and controls over those in the securities business, again with 
emphasis on the over-the-counter market. We believe that these 
purposes are interrelated and have a common goal-the raising 
of standards in the securities markets. Basic and reliable corporate 
information, essential for informed investing, is a necessary ad-
junct to higher qualifications for those who deal in over-the-
counter securities. Improved standards in the securities markets 
are best assured by the combination of better information about 
securities, on the one hand, and better qualified persons to utilize 
and evaluate that information, on the other. Each proposal in the 
bill would be an important advance, but it is the sum of all of 
them which will produce the maximum benefit in the public 
interest. 
To be specific, the first important aspect of the bill relates to 
extending the so-called reporting, proxy and insider trading re-
quirements to over-the-counter companies having more than 750 
shareholders (after two years, 500 shareholders) and more than 
one million dollars in assets. The reporting requirements, of 
course, refer to the obligation of companies to file with the Com-
mission annual and periodic reports containing financial and 
business information.36 The proxy rules require that informa-
tion be transmitted to shareholders as a basis for informed voting.87 
The insider trading provisions require reports of insider securities 
transactions and provide for the recapture of short-swing profits.88 
At present these provisions are generally applicable only to share-
holders in listed companies. The Commission has long endeavored 
to secure their applicability to over-the-counter companies.80 
The Special Study Report strongly confirms the need for 
these safeguards. Investor protection must rely on adequate, re-
liable and timely information about companies trading in the 
securities markets. In the absence of this information, the Report 
indicates the flourishing of fraudulent sales practices, irresponsi-
sa Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 12, 13. 
87 SEC Reg. 14, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (Cum. Supp. 1963). 
88 48 Stat. 881 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1958). 
39 Similar legislation, generally known as the Frear-Fulbright bill, had been introduced 
by the Commission in the past. Special Study pt. 3, at 6-7. 
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ble investment advice, misleading corporate public relations and 
erratic trading markets.40 Thus, this segment of the bill would 
seek to extend the conservative principle of full disclosure to a 
market where it does not fully operate. 
The second major segment of our legislation relates to the 
quality of personnel in the securities industry. As far as federal 
law is concerned, there is almost free entry into the brokerage 
business.41 The major exchanges, however, have imposed certain 
standards in this field.42 On the other hand, there is a question as 
to the authority of the NASD to do the same with respect to 
brokers in the over-the-counter market.43 Accordingly, the bill 
would authorize the NASD, under the supervision of the Com-
mission, to establish standards of training, experience and capital. 
There is a clear need for better qualified people in the securities 
industry. The Report showed boiler-room salesmen "floating" 
from firm to firm, branch offices headed by inexperienced super-
visory personnel, and untrained analysts sending out market 
letters.44 It is thus quite clear that a vital key to improvement in 
the securities markets is improvement of the qualifications of those 
entering the business and those assuming particular responsibili-
ties, such as the branch managers. 
C. As indicated in our letters of transmittal of the Report to 
Congress, most of the recommendations of the Study that the Com-
mission accepted may be carried out under existing legislation.45 
For example, in the trading area with regard to exchange markets, 
the Commission itself has very broad rule-making powers.46 As to 
the over-the-counter market, the Commission's powers are tied in 
with anti-fraud concepts but are still quite imposing.47 The self-
regulatory agencies may, of course, operate in the broadest area 
and prescribe ethical standards. •The Report proposed many 
recommendations for change in the Commission's rules and in the 
rules and practices of the self-regulatory agencies as well as in the 
industry as a whole. The next step, therefore, is to enter into a 
more formal process of rule-making. 
Action will continue for some time on several fronts. As already 
indicated, members of the financial community in certain cases 
40 Id. ch. X. 
41 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(b). 
42 Special Study pt. 1, at 75-81, 120-31, 140-41. 
48 Id. at 48; Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15A(b)(3), (4). 
44 See generally Special Study pt. 1, ch. II. 
45 Id. pt. 2, at vi. 
46 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 11. 
47 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ l0(b), 15(c)(l), 15(c)(2). 
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will voluntarily adopt procedures suggested by the Report. Self-
regulatory agencies are expected to take the initiative in adopting 
rules and practices to overcome disclosed inadequacies. The Com-
mission has expressed its concurrence with the judgment of the 
Study that the basic design of substantial reliance on industry 
self-regulation appears to have stood the test of time and to have 
worked effectively in most areas.48 We anticipate greater responsi-
bilities will be assumed by these agencies. They must, therefore, 
raise their entire level of performance to their demonstrated 
capabilities. 
At the same time, the Commission itself, as overseer of the 
self-regulators, is in the process of revising its rules and operations 
to meet the problems uncovered by the Study. Prior to releasing 
publicly the rules themselves for discussion, however, we are 
following a policy (previously noted) of meeting with the industry, 
obtaining reactions, and identifying any obstacles to promulgating 
a particular rule from a business standpoint. Some of the items 
which have a recognized priority involve selling practices, includ-
ing controls over salesmen and statements of policy respecting 
selling literature, exchange matters including floor trading, odd 
lots, specialists and automation, and the over-the-counter market, 
including the quotations system, NASD "mark-up" policy, and 
retail executions. Changes will not be wrought in a day, but on 
the other hand, after a reasonable time and thorough discussion 
with the industry, solutions should be reached while a thorough 
study of the subject is still fresh in mind. 
I have, of course, touched only briefly on selected aspects of 
the Report of Special Study of Securities Markets. All of the 
thirteen chapters raise important questions which are worthy of 
detailed analysis. The papers •presented in this symposium focus 
on some of these problems. Commissioner Whitney highlights the 
more vexing problems raised by distributions under Rule 1 Ob-6. 
Mr. Loomis and Mr. Rotberg study the matter of quotations for 
the over-the-counter market. Professor Knauss evaluates the cur-
rent role of disclosure in the securities markets. Professor Painter 
examines the present status of short-swing profit recovery under 
section 16(b) of the Exchange Act. The student comment is con-
cerned with four key problem areas presented by the Special Study 
Report. These articles and student contributions, together with 
the continuing debates on the Report, should produce a healthy 
ferment on the state of securities regulation for the next decade. 
48 special Study pt. 4, at vi. 
